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REASSESSING THE REGULATION OF HIGH-RISK
MEDICAL DEVICE CASES
Robert L. Rabin* and Alyssa J. Picard**
INTRODUCTION
Beginning in the mid-1960s, there was a surge of federal legislative
activity aimed at regulation of health and safety concerns.1 By 1972,
this wave had more or less ended its surge and retreated to an imple-
mentation phase. Strikingly, medical device regulation had been
passed by. But not for long. In 1976, Congress enacted the Medical
Device Amendments (MDA), plugging a gap between regulation of
prescription drugs, which were subjected to a premarket protocol
aimed at assuring safety and efficacy, and medical devices, which were
solely monitored for adulteration and misbranding after distribution in
the marketplace.2
Somewhat earlier, this system had revealed itself to be less than ad-
equate. The Study Group on Medical Devices (the “Cooper Commit-
tee”), convened in 1969 by the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare, had published a report the following year pointing to 10,000
injuries and 751 deaths from medical devices over the previous dec-
ade, and the Committee recommended replacing the current system
with a dedicated regulatory regime for devices.3 Meanwhile, the
Dalkon Shield intrauterine device served as a high-profile symbol of
the failures of the previous system after it was pulled from the market
* A. Calder Mackay Professor of Law, Stanford Law School.
** Stanford Law School Class of 2020.
1. See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189,
1248 (1986).
2. “The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 authorized the FDA to seize adulter-
ated or misbranded devices and to seek injunctions or criminal prosecutions against manufactur-
ers or distributors of violative articles,” but this meant that the FDA bore the burden of proving
each item was unsafe, and that regulation often came after the fact of injury and at the expense
of considerable agency time and resources. Robert B. Leflar, Public Accountability and Medical
Device Regulation, 2 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 6 (1989).
3. STUDY GRP. ON MED. DEVICES, DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, MEDICAL DE-
VICES: A LEGISLATIVE PLAN (1970). See also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/HRD-
83-53, FEDERAL REGULATION OF MEDICAL DEVICES—PROBLEMS STILL TO BE OVERCOME 2, 20
(1983).
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in 1974 following reports of infections, injuries, and deaths—for a to-
tal of over 300,000 complaints.4 The MDA was Congress’s response.
Since the implementation of the 1976 regime, medical devices are
classified by risk-level and intended use into three categories, which
determine the stringency of the regulations and the premarket ap-
proval processes to which the devices must adhere.
Class I devices present “minimal potential for harm” and are simple
in design; they include things like tongue depressors, elastic bandages,
and bedpans.5 They currently represent about 47% of medical
devices.6
Class II devices are more complex, but still not life-sustaining—they
include devices such as powered wheelchairs and pregnancy test kits,
and they encompass 43% of medical devices.7
Class III devices “usually sustain or support life, are implanted, or
present potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury;” they re-
present the remaining 10% of medical devices and include devices like
pacemakers, breast implants, and intrauterine devices.8
There are general requirements the U.S. Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA) sets for all devices, including those not subject to
clinical testing.9
4. A number of books have been written on the Dalkon Shield claims. See, e.g., MORTON
MINTZ, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE DALKON SHIELD (1985).
5. Learn If a Medical Device Has Been Cleared by FDA for Marketing, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ResourcesforYou/Consumers/ucm142523.htm (last
updated Dec. 29, 2017).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. All devices must adhere to “general controls,” which include basic regulations governing
proper labeling, manufacturer registration, and manufacturing quality control. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 360c(a)(1)(A)(i) (2012). Class II devices are subject to additional “special controls,” including
post-market surveillance, patient registries, and performance standards promulgated for specific
devices. Id. § 360c(a)(1)(B). Despite these requirements, most Class I devices (95%) and some
Class II devices fall into generic categories of exempted devices, meaning neither a 510(k)
premarket notification application nor further analysis is required to market them. Class I/II
Exemptions, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegula
tionandGuidance/Overview/ClassifyYourDevice/ucm051549.htm (last updated Mar. 22, 2018).
The FDA is authorized to designate these types of exempt generic devices by § 513(d)(2)(A) of
the FDCA (codified as 21 U.S.C. § 360c(d)(2)(A)), and defines these categories in 21 C.F.R.
§§ 862–892 (2018). For all exempt devices, the manufacturer still must register their establish-
ment and list their generic product with the FDA.
Likewise, all devices must conform to the current “Good Manufacturing Practices” (GMP),
which the FDA may promulgate after taking recommendations from an advisory committee and
holding an oral hearing on any proposed regulations (individual manufacturers may still petition
for an exemption or variance from these regulations). 21 U.S.C. § 360j(f) (2012). Since 1996,
these have been laid out in 21 C.F.R. § 820 (2018).
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Only Class III devices are required to go through the premarket
approval process (PMA)—a process that requires clinical data.10 In a
leading case on the preemption of tort claims, Riegel v. Medtronic,
Inc.,11 the U.S. Supreme Court had occasion to review the rigor of
PMA premarketing oversight and concluded that it was indeed nota-
ble for its scrupulousness.12 On average, the Court noted, the FDA
spent 1,200 hours reviewing an application, which included reports of
every study and investigation of the device, a description of compo-
Class I and II devices are also subject to premarket notification requirements, wherein the
manufacturer must register with the FDA its intent to market a device and submit an application
describing the device, the class to which the device belongs, proposed labeling, and a description
of the actions taken to comply with the applicable requirements. The FDA then engages in a
limited form of review to determine whether the device is “substantially equivalent” to a preex-
isting legally marketed device. If so, no further regulatory analysis is required before the devices
can enter the market. This is known as the 510(k) clearance process. Many commentators have
noted that the 510(k) process offers a very low bar for manufacturers to meet; it is generally
completed quickly and only very rarely results in the rejection or delay of a device. See, e.g.,
Lewis v. Johnson & Johnson, 991 F. Supp. 2d 748, 753 (S.D. W. Va. 2014) (noting that an average
510(k) review process takes only 20 hours); Robert Adler, The 1976 Medical Device Amend-
ments: A Step in the Right Direction Needs Another Step in the Right Direction, 43 FOOD DRUG
COSM. L.J. 511, 516 (1988) (“A 510(k) notification requires very little information, rarely elicits a
negative response from the FDA, and gets processed very quickly.”); Marilyn Uzdavines, Dying
for a Solution: The Regulation of Medical Devices Falls Short in the 21st Century Cures Act, 18
NEV. L.J. 629, 641 (2018) (“[T]he focus is on equivalence rather than safety.”).
10. Even for Class III devices, however, there are exceptions to PMA review. For example, in
passing the MDA in 1976, Congress did not suddenly require all medical devices already on the
market to be made unavailable and subjected to PMA review. Instead, a “grandfather clause”
was written into the statute, which allowed any “pre-amendments device” (i.e., a device legally
marketed in the United States by a firm before May 28, 1976) to stay on the market, provided
that it had not been significantly changed or modified since before May 28, 1976 and that the
FDA had not published a regulation specifically requiring a PMA application for that particular
device. Premarket Notification (510k), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/medical
devices/deviceregulationandguidance/howtomarketyourdevice/premarketsubmissions/premarket
notification510k/default.htm#preamend (last updated Sept. 27, 2018).
As a result, no studies, clinical data, or further marketing approval was necessary for devices
which predated FDA’s modern regulatory regime. This remains true even if a pre-amendments
device is classified as Class III. Special Considerations, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www
.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketYourDevice/Premarket
Submissions/PremarketNotification510k/ucm134578.htm (last updated Jan. 22, 2019).
Although Congressional intent in including this provision in the MDA seems to have been for
the FDA to eventually promulgate regulations providing for the PMA applications for the vari-
ous pre-amendment devices, the FDA has been slow to do so. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-09-90, FDA SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO ENSURE THAT HIGH-RISK DEVICE TYPES
ARE APPROVED THROUGH THE MOST STRINGENT PREMARKET REVIEW PROCESS 10–11 (2009)
[hereinafter GAO-09-90]. There remain many types of pre-amendment Class III devices for
which the FDA has neither issued a reclassification nor published regulations requiring PMA
submissions. Id. at 16, 20. FDA officials have acknowledged that these actions are important and
have yet to be taken, but there is no set time frame for doing so. Id. at 23.
For additional exceptions to PMA review, see infra Parts I.A, D, and E.
11. 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
12. Id. at 317–18.
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nent parts, samples of products, a specimen of the proposed labeling,
and descriptions of the production, manufacturing, packaging, and in-
stallation methods.13 As part of the PMA process, the FDA had dis-
cretion to bring in a panel of outside experts and could request more
information or data from the manufacturer.14
Viewing the process through this lens, the Court preempted the
plaintiff’s tort claim, which was based on failure to adequately warn of
the risk that defendant manufacturer’s balloon catheter would rupture
during angioplasty surgery—a risk that came to fruition. According to
the Court, Section 360k of the MDA—an express preemption clause
barring “any requirement . . . which is different from, or in addition to,
any requirement . . . [under the Act] which relates to the safety or
effectiveness of the device . . . .”—was applicable to the claim.15
A sharp line was drawn between the PMA process in Riegel and
FDA’s 510(k) substantial equivalence review, which only subjects a
device to a limited form of review to determine whether it is “substan-
tially equivalent” to a preexisting legally marketed device.16 Twelve
years earlier, in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,17 the Supreme Court found
substantial equivalence review insufficiently rigorous to preempt tort
claims. Taken together, the two decisions seemed to mark out a per-
suasive boundary between tort claims that would, if allowed, imper-
missibly re-tread the same ground covered by the agency (via the
PMA process), and claims premised on a risk/utility tort process com-
plementary to the once-over-lightly of “substantial equivalence”
review.18
In this Article, Part I probes more deeply into the case for recogniz-
ing a safe harbor from tort claims under the existing regime of FDA
premarket assessment of high-risk devices.19 Part II addresses post-
market FDA strategies for assessment of product safety. Part III shifts
the focal point to tort, revisiting the shadow cast by preemption over
13. Id. at 318. See also 21 U.S.C. § 360e (2012).
14. 21 C.F.R. § 814.44(a) (2018).
15. 21 U.S.C. § 360k (2012); Riegel, 552 U.S. at 316.
16. 21 C.F.R. § 807.81–97 (2018). See discussion supra note 9 and infra Part I.A.
17. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
18. Indeed, I took this position in Robert L. Rabin, Conflicting Conceptions of Tort Preemp-
tion: Territorial Claims in the Domain of Accidental Harm, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 987 (2009).
19. Although the PMA process is required by default for all high-risk (Class III) devices, in
actuality it is only triggered for a small minority of devices that go to market—currently, only
1% of all devices go through the PMA process. See Rita Redberg, Medical Device Recalls: Get It
Right the First Time, 171 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1011, 1011 (2011). As noted above, approxi-
mately 90% of devices fall into Classes I and II, and so were never subject to the PMA require-
ment; the remaining 9%, however, are Class III devices that fall under some exception to PMA
review.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\68-2\DPL211.txt unknown Seq: 5  9-APR-19 10:33
2019] HIGH-RISK MEDICAL DEVICE CASES 313
tort as a complementary regulatory strategy. Finally, Part IV offers
concluding thoughts on the necessity of a fresh look at the regulatory
process in action—and reconsideration of how it might be improved
in this vital area of health and safety.
I. THE PREMARKET APPROVAL PROCESS: LOOKING
BENEATH THE SURFACE
A. 510(k) Review
More explicitly, with reference to Lohr and the substantial equiva-
lence exception to PMA review, the plaintiff’s defective design claim
was based on injury from the malfunctioning of a pacemaker inserted
to correct a cardiac irregularity. Under the substantial equivalence
provision, the pacemaker was fast-tracked because of its similarity to
other such devices already on the market. In other words, there was
no evidence-based, risk/benefit inquiry by the FDA focused on the
precise design of the defendant’s pacemaker. As a consequence, there
was no basis for a preemption defense claiming that the tort suit
would be going over the same ground as the agency regulatory ap-
proval process. This carve-out from the statutory preemption clause
seemed to the Supreme Court consistent with the strictures of the
Supremacy Clause.20 And so matters stood in the Court for more than
a decade, until Riegel—addressing a tort claim in the context of PMA
approval—animated successful recourse to the statutory preemption
clause.
Critically, one should note that the FDA relies on the 510(k) sub-
stantial equivalence process in a considerable number of cases involv-
ing Class III medical devices.21 Hence, whatever limitations Riegel
might place on the role of tort in high-risk PMA medical device cases,
Lohr does stand for tort liability as a potential sanction when injuries
result from devices that never underwent focused, evidence-based reg-
ulatory scrutiny.
B. Safe Harbor/Troubled Waters
But does Riegel, extolling the safeguards of PMA review—and con-
comitantly creating a safe harbor from tort claims—in fact set a terri-
torial boundary that creates confidence that optimal safety and
20. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
21. In fiscal years 2003 through 2007, the FDA reviewed 342 submissions for Class III devices
through the 510(k) process and cleared 228 of them; reviewed 784 supplemental PMA applica-
tions and cleared 664 of them; and reviewed only 217 original PMA applications and cleared 170
of them. GAO-09-90, supra note 10, at 6.
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efficacy is being monitored by the agency? As the following will sug-
gest, there is room for substantial doubt.22 Beneath the surface gloss
of procedural regularity that so enamored the Court, several studies of
the clinical data that serve as inputs to the FDA review and approval
process reveal a disquieting picture.23
In a 2009 systematic review of PMA studies for high-risk cardiovas-
cular devices (which included 123 studies of 78 devices), it was found
that only 27% of the studies were randomized and only 14% were
blinded.24 Study participants were 66.9% male and 87% white, likely
indicating study populations that are not representative of actual pa-
tients using the devices once they are on the market.25 Furthermore,
of the 78 devices studied, the majority of them (65%) received
premarket approval after being supported by only a single study.26
Another study, in 2015, examined 286 clinical studies associated
with 28 devices that received FDA approval in 2010 and 2011. The
2015 study found that all of the premarket studies included were in-
dustry-funded, approximately 60% of the post-market follow-up stud-
ies were industry-funded, roughly 75% were unblinded, and nearly
50% were single-group and therefore had no comparator.27 In particu-
lar, the “pivotal studies” (so-called because they are meant to prove
the safety and effectiveness required of the device for a successful
PMA application) in that sample “generally enrolled fewer than 300
patients and were often designed without blinding, comparators, or
primary end point follow-up exceeding 1 year.”28 In general, the au-
thors concluded that “the amount and quality of evidence generated
over [a] total product lifecycle varies widely,” and that “premarket
22. In this regard, I expand on the clinical process observations in Rita F. Redberg, Improving
the Safety of High-Risk Medical Devices, 68 DEPAUL L. REV. 327 (2019) [hereinafter Redberg,
Improving the Safety of High-Risk Medical Devices].
23. As Dr. Redberg notes:
Discovering a safety problem with an implanted device carries a greater risk for pa-
tients. Unlike a drug discovered to be associated with adverse events, which can simply
be stopped, an implanted device must either be removed in a risky procedure or left in
the body with the attendant risk. Thus, high-quality RCTs to assure safety and effec-
tiveness for high-risk devices prior to approval would go a long way to improve patient
safety and to ensure we are not recommending unnecessary or harmful devices to
patients.
Id. at 331.
24. Sanket S. Dhruva et al., Strength of Study Evidence Examined by the FDA in Premarket
Approval of Cardiovascular Devices, 302 JAMA 2679, 2680 (2009).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Vinay K. Rathi et al., Characteristics of Clinical Studies Conducted Over the Total Product
Life Cycle of High-Risk Therapeutic Medical Devices Receiving FDA Premarket Approval in
2010 and 2011, 314 JAMA 604, 608–09 (2015).
28. Id. at 610.
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studies provide limited data to address important clinical questions
that often arise after approval, including those related to long-term
device performance, new indications or iterations, and safety and ef-
fectiveness in real-world populations.”29
Especially for implantable devices that are designed to be used over
a long period of time, the data collected through these studies may be
insufficient for making optimal regulatory and clinical decisions.30 But
the Riegel Court is quite clear that it is not about to second-guess the
FDA’s stamp of approval once it has been assured that the manufac-
turer has dutifully complied with the PMA regulatory specifications.
Nonetheless, a straightforward challenge to the foundational premise
of the Riegel decision is not necessarily the only pathway to reassess-
ing and refining the case for preemption.
C. New Evidence
In her Riegel dissent, Justice Ginsburg alludes to a scenario that was
neither presented nor discussed in the majority opinion:
The Court’s holding does not reach an important issue outside the
bounds of this case: the preemptive effect of 360k(a) where evi-
dence of a medical device’s defect comes to light only after the de-
vice receives premarket approval.31
This is indeed a critical issue. Conflict preemption rests on the pre-
mise that a tort suit would be improperly reexamining the evidence-
based determination that served as the foundation for regulatory ap-
proval. As such, a finding that substantial new evidence of risks associ-
ated with the device arose after regulatory approval—risks which have
not been addressed post-approval by the agency—suggests that the
29. Id.
30. An additional concern is that there are some notable disconnects between some of the
FDA summaries of the clinical studies that support successful PMA applications and the same
studies when they are later published—suggesting that medical device companies might engage
in selective reporting of data when they submit their PMA applications to the FDA. One report
on this issue examined 106 cardiovascular devices that received approval based on PMA applica-
tions between 2000 and 2010, after being supported by 177 clinical studies. Lee Chang et al.,
Selective Reporting in Trials of High Risk Cardiovascular Devices: Cross Sectional Comparison
Between Premarket Approval Summaries and Published Reports, 350 BRIT. MED. J. h2613
(2015). The authors found that as of January 2013, only 49% of those studies had been separately
published. Id. Amongst those trials that had been published, a significant number of them “dif-
fer[ed] substantially” in study population, primary endpoints, and results from the data submit-
ted to the FDA as part of the PMA process. Id. Besides the conclusion that selective reporting
might be weakening the efficacy of the PMA process, the report also highlights the related issue
of the lack of scientific transparency throughout the process. With only 49% of the studies result-
ing in peer-reviewed publications, it remains impossible to assess the gravity of the problem of
selective reporting in the majority of PMA applications.
31. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 333 n.1 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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plaintiff’s tort claim is beyond the reach of the preemption
provision.32
D. PMA Supplements
Moreover, the formal character of the PMA process, as set out in
Riegel, is at odds with medical device marketing practices in the real
world. If a Class III device has been subjected to modification since
receiving PMA certification, the modified device can be approved
through a less rigorous procedure known as a “PMA supplement,”33
which has fewer evidence and data requirements than an original
PMA. Most notably, it generally does not require any new clinical
data to account for the modifications.34 This path remains open even if
a device has gone through many iterations of changes; indeed, “almost
all PMA devices” accumulate several, and often hundreds, of
supplements.35
In addition to the lack of additional clinical data requirements, the
PMA supplement process is also notable because it involves only
piecemeal evaluation: each submitted supplement application for a
given device is evaluated separately. This means that a company can
submit modifications to a device one PMA supplement at a time,
rather than including all of the modifications in a single application.36
This process “makes it difficult, if not impossible, to take into account
the cumulative effects and interactions of multiple modifications,” and
it may result in a device on the market that differs significantly from
the one that was subject to clinical testing in the original PMA pro-
cess.37 The piecemeal nature of the supplement process also means
that there can be many different models of an original PMA device
left on the market at once, and it can be “virtually impossible” for
physicians to track and understand which supplemental modifications
apply to which model.38
32. See Rabin, supra note 18, at 1001–02.
33. 21 C.F.R. § 814.39 (2018). See also PMA Supplements and Amendments, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMar
ketYourDevice/PremarketSubmissions/PremarketApprovalPMA/ucm050467.htm (last updated
Dec. 14, 2018).
34. Sarah Zheng & Rita Redberg, Premarket Approval Supplement Pathway: Do We Know
What We Are Getting?, 160 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 798 (2014).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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E. Humanitarian Devices
If a Class III device is meant to treat a rare condition or disease, it
can fall into another exception to the PMA process known as the Hu-
manitarian Device Exemption (HDE).39 The HDE process is similar
to PMA review, but, crucially, the efficacy requirements are lower.
Instead, the FDA requires that devices approved under this exemp-
tion show a “probable benefit” in clinical trials on a small number of
patients.40
In order to be considered for this exemption, comparable devices
must not be available through any other FDA pathway; the device
must not pose an “unreasonable risk of illness or injury;” and its
“probable benefit must outweigh its risks.”41 The 21st Century Cures
Act of 2016 expanded the limits of this program: Currently, devices
eligible for this exemption should be intended to treat or diagnose
diseases or conditions affecting no more than 8,000 U.S. patients (an
increase from the previous 4,000-patient limitation).42 As part of the
assessment for these devices, the FDA is to consider the target patient
population and size, as well as the device’s intended use and existing
treatment options.43 Under the FDA Reauthorization Act of 2017,44
either an Institutional Review Board or an “appropriate local commit-
tee” can approve a humanitarian use device under this exemption.45
Since this process was implemented in 1990, 72 devices have been
brought to market through the humanitarian device exemption.46
If this array of premarketing approval processes falls short of assur-
ing optimal patient safety and efficacy, it might nonetheless be back-
stopped by effective monitoring of device performance through post-
marketing assessment. On this score, consider the following.
39. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 814.100–126 (2018).
40. Humanitarian Device Exemption (HDE) Program: Draft Guidance for Industry and Food
and Drug Administration Staff, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 15–17 (June 13, 2018), https://www
.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/guidancedocuments/ucm3892
75.pdf.
41. Ari Gartenberg et al., Presumed Safe No More: Lessons from the Wingspan Saga on Regu-
lation of Devices, 348 BRIT. MED. J. g93 (2014).
42. Ana Mulero, FDA Clarifies Humanitarian Device Exemption Policies, REG. AFF. PROF.
SOC’Y (June 12, 2018), https://www.raps.org/news-and-articles/news-articles/2018/6/fda-drafts-de
sign-of-for-humanitarian-device-exemp.
43. Id.
44. Pub. L. No. 115-52, 131 Stat. 1005 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360j(m) (Supp. V 2018)).
45. The FDA is currently soliciting comments on the requirements of such a committee for the
HDE program.
46. Listing of CDRH Humanitarian Device Exemptions, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://
www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/DeviceApprovalsandClearances/
HDEApprovals/ucm161827.htm (last updated Sept. 17, 2018).
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II. POST-MARKETING STRATEGIES FOR ASSESSING
PRODUCT SAFETY
A. Post-Approval Studies
At the time it approves a manufacturer’s PMA application or when
approving a device through the HDE process, the FDA may order the
manufacturer to conduct a post-approval study (PAS).47 Under re-
forms introduced by the Safe Medical Devices Act,48 the FDA may
also order a “post-market surveillance study” of a device (this time,
including those not only from the PMA and humanitarian device
pathways but also those approved through the 510(k) pathway).
Amongst other triggering conditions, such a study is warranted when
the device’s failure would be “reasonably likely to have serious ad-
verse health consequences,” and when FDA officials identify a poten-
tial issue with a device through adverse event reports or reviews of
scientific literature.49
The FDA has indicated that it would like to strengthen the PAS
system; in 2013, it issued a strategic plan titled “Strengthening Our
National System for Medical Device Postmarket Surveillance.”50 And
indeed, it has ordered manufacturers to complete hundreds of PASs
over the past few years: 223 PASs for 158 devices that had been ap-
proved between 2005 and 2011.51 During that six-year period, about
half the PMA applications approved had a PAS requirement.52 How-
ever, these orders are not necessarily translating into high-quality fol-
low-up data. At the time of a 2014 study, only 26% of the 223 PASs
ordered between 2005 and 2011 had been completed;53 despite this,
the FDA has never issued a warning letter or penalty due to study
47. Ian S. Reynolds et al., Assessing the Safety and Effectiveness of Devices After U.S. Food
and Drug Administration Approval: FDA-Mandated Postapproval Studies, 174 JAMA INTERNAL
MED. 1773, 1774 (2014); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-815, FDA ORDERED
POSTMARKET STUDIES TO BETTER UNDERSTAND SAFETY ISSUES, AND MANY STUDIES ARE
ONGOING 4 (2015) [hereinafter GAO-15-815].
48. Pub. L. No. 101-629, § 522, 104 Stat. 4511, 4521 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360l (2012)).
49. Postmarket Surveillance Under Section 522 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act:
Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 4–6
(May 16, 2016), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuid
ance/GuidanceDocuments/ucm268141.pdf.
50. Strengthening Our National System for Medical Device Postmarket Surveillance: Update
and Next Steps, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https:/www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/
Safety/CDRHPostmarketSurveillance/UCM348845.pdf [http://wayback.archive-it.org/7993/2017
0406001015/https:/www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/Safety/CDRHPostmarketSurveil
lance/UCM348845.pdf] (last visited Jan. 31, 2019).
51. Reynolds et al., supra note 47, at 1775.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1776.
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delays, inadequate progress, or any other issues related to the PAS
requirements.54 This is potentially a serious problem, as it does appear
that completed PASs can alter clinical or regulatory guidance: 53% of
the completed PASs caused the FDA to request a labelling change for
the relevant device, and at least one PAS uncovered results that
caused the FDA to remove the device from the market entirely.55
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) performed a similar
study in 2015, this time looking at both the PASs and the post-market
surveillance studies ordered between 2007 and 2015.56 Among the
PASs, it found that 20% had been completed and 72% were still cate-
gorized as ongoing (with an additional 8% inactive due to circum-
stances like the device no longer being on the market).57 Of the 225
PASs identified as “ongoing,” 43 of them (19%) were delayed.58 Both
sets of “adequately progressing” and “delayed” studies had been
ongoing for an average of a little over three years each.59
Among the 392 post-market surveillance studies ordered during a
similar time period, 88% were categorized as inactive. Of these, 31%
had been consolidated into a single study (so work might still be ongo-
ing). For another 31%, the FDA allowed the termination of the study
(which may have happened when, for example, the manufacturer
changed the indication for use that was the subject of the study, or
when the manufacturer could demonstrate the objective of the study
using publicly available data and the FDA agreed with the results).
The remaining 38% were categorized as inactive for other reasons
(usually because the device was taken off the market).60 Only 2% of
the post-market surveillance studies ordered were considered com-
pleted.61 Of the 40 studies still ongoing, nearly half were considered
delayed.62
Notably, the post-market surveillance study system is used over-
whelmingly for devices cleared through the 510(k) pathway—94% of
the 392 studies the GAO considered were for 510(k) devices.63 Given
that these devices are initially cleared for marketing without any
54. Id. at 1777.
55. Id. at 1776–77.
56. GAO-15-815, supra note 47.
57. Id. at 14.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 15. The 20% of studies that had been completed were completed in an average of
three years. Id.
60. Id. at 19.
61. Id. at 20.
62. GAO-15-815, supra note 47, at 20.
63. Id. at 18.
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clinical data, it is especially concerning in these cases that the post-
market clinical studies are so inconsistently completed.
B. Adverse Event Reporting
In addition to PASs and post-market surveillance studies, the FDA
also has processes in place for collecting adverse event reports on de-
vices already on the market as part of its overall system of post-mar-
ket surveillance.64 This component of the post-market regulatory
regime is known as Medical Device Reporting (MDR).
The MDR system works in two ways. First, it has mandatory report-
ing requirements for manufacturers, importers, and device user facili-
ties, who must report either to the FDA or to the device manufacturer
after certain device-related problems occur.65 Second, it has a volun-
tary reporting component, whereby healthcare professionals, patients,
caregivers, and consumers can submit reports of “significant adverse
events or product problems” to “MedWatch,” a reporting program
run by the FDA.66
As with the PASs and post-market surveillance studies, critics of the
MDR system say it is under-utilized and thus contributes weakly to
improving device safety.67 This may be due in part to vague language
where mandatory reporting is concerned. As one commentator has
noted (focusing specifically on hospitals as “device user facilities”):
Hospitals cannot be blamed fully for failures to report. The report-
ing requirement states that reporting is necessary if a device “may
have caused death or serious illness or injury or a malfunction.” The
qualifier “may” throws confusion into the definition. Isaac Chang,
PhD, Director of the Division of Postmarket Surveillance at the
FDA’s Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH), says
64. See Medical Device Reporting, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Medical
Devices/Safety/ReportaProblem/default.htm (last updated Sept. 25, 2018).
65. 21 C.F.R. § 803 (2018). See Mandatory Reporting Requirements: Manufacturers, Importers
and Device User Facilities, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/
DeviceRegulationandGuidance/PostmarketRequirements/ReportingAdverseEvents/ucm20057
37.htm (last updated Sept. 27, 2018) (outlining the specific reporting requirements for the differ-
ent entities depending on the type of adverse event).
66. Medical Device Reporting, supra note 64.
67. See, e.g., Elaine Silvestrini, FDA Change Would Weaken Already Weak Reporting System,
Critics Say, DRUGWATCH, https://www.drugwatch.com/news/2018/03/01/fda-change-weaken-al
ready-weak-reporting-system-critics-say/ (last updated Apr. 17, 2018) (arguing that the FDA
should “take a look at its medical device reporting system” and that “the public needs more
information from medical device makers”); Why “Approved” Medical Devices in the U.S. May
Not Be Safe or Effective, HEALTH NEWS REV., https://www.healthnewsreview.org/toolkit/tips-
for-understanding-studies/medical-devices/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2019) (stating that
“[m]anufacturers under-report device-related deaths, serious injuries and malfunctions” and
providing examples of incidents when serious adverse events associated with specific devices
went unreported).
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that a hospital does not have to provide “causality” before report-
ing. Almost every word of the reporting requirement can be parsed.
“Serious illness or injury” means a life-threatening situation or per-
manent impairment, or damage to a body function or structure.
Even temporary impairment dictates a report when there was quick
medical or surgical intervention to prevent it from becoming perma-
nent. And even if a “life-threatening” condition is a temporary
threat, it must be reported. The “malfunction” portion of the re-
quirement is equally ambiguous.68
And while the FDA has produced some guidance documents for
manufacturers, importers, and device user facilities to follow in decid-
ing whether to report an event, it seems these have also produced fur-
ther ambiguities.69 The FDA itself has recognized that even those
entities subject to the mandatory reporting requirements (such as hos-
pitals) tend to underreport adverse events which should have been
covered under 21 C.F.R. § 803.70 As they have characterized the prob-
lem, “[h]ospital staff often [are] not aware of, nor trained to comply
with, all of the FDA’s medical device reporting requirements.”71 How-
ever, there has been very little responsive remedial action taken to
bring underreporting entities into compliance.72 These problems are
not at all new—a GAO report from 1997 focused on the same themes
of noncompliance and underreporting that are still discussed today.73
Even if reporting rates were to pick up, this type of passive surveil-
lance (wherein passive information from MDR reports is gathered
into a database) is of only limited utility for improving device safety.
The FDA has begun testing some pilot systems with more advanced
features that would, for example, allow for electronic data submis-
sions, automated tracking of specific devices, or the collection of more
clinical data.74 However, none of these programs are yet widely used.
68. Stephen Barlas, FDA Flags Inconsistent Hospital Reporting of Medical Device Problems:
Hazy Reporting Rules Beget Confusion, 42 PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 97, 97 (2017).
69. Id. at 98.
70. A spokesman for the FDA stated in early 2016 that, “We believe that these [17 hospitals
under investigation for under-reporting] are not unique in that there is limited to no reporting to
the FDA or to the manufacturers at some hospitals.” Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 115.
73. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-97-21, MEDICAL DEVICE REPORT-
ING: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN FDA’S SYSTEM FOR MONITORING PROBLEMS WITH APPROVED
DEVICES (1997). For a concrete illustration of the deficiencies in the system, consider the Riata
defibrillator leads case discussed infra note 92.
74. See Barlas, supra note 68, at 99 (describing the MedSun, Sentinel, and NEST programs);
Marilyn Flack et al., Identifying, Understanding, and Communicating Medical Device Use Errors:
Observations from an FDA Pilot Program, in 3 ADVANCES IN PATIENT SAFETY: FROM RE-
SEARCH TO IMPLEMENTATION 223 (Kerm Henriksen et al. eds., 2005) (describing and analyzing
the MedSun pilot program).
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Given the difficulties the FDA has faced with obtaining compliance
with the less resource-intensive, passive, information-based MDR sys-
tem, it may take a substantial amount of time before hospitals or other
entities move to more costly systems.75
III. PREEMPTION REVISITED: TORT AS A
COMPLEMENTARY STRATEGY
A. Current State of Preemption: Supreme Court Trilogy
As has been previously discussed, preemption of tort claims limits
the scenarios in which patients injured by medical devices may turn to
litigation for relief. There are doctrines of both express and implied
preemption operating in this sphere that may prevent lawsuits from
moving forward.
To reiterate, Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., addressed the issue of the
MDA’s express preemption of state tort law claims for devices which
had gone through the PMA process (Section 360k), which bars tort
claims alleging that the device “violated state tort law notwithstanding
compliance with the relevant federal requirements.”76 In contrast, in
the previous case, Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, the Court held that for in-
juries stemming from devices which had only been cleared through
the 510(k) substantial equivalence pathway (as opposed to the more
rigorous PMA process), state common law claims did not face any
barrier from express preemption.77
State tort law claims can also be impliedly preempted, as the Court
addressed in Buckman v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee.78 In that case,
the plaintiffs did not plead traditional common law causes of action in
negligence or strict liability, but instead asserted that the device’s
manufacturer had made fraudulent representations to the FDA, and
that these representations were the but-for cause of their injuries:
“had the representations not been made, the FDA would not have
approved the devices, and the plaintiffs would not have been
injured.”79
The Court held that such claims are preempted—not expressly by
Section 360k, but nevertheless impliedly—because “the federal statu-
tory scheme amply empowers the FDA to punish and deter fraud
against the Agency, and . . . this authority is used by the Agency to
75. Barlas, supra note 68, at 115.
76. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008).
77. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 471 (1996).
78. 531 U.S. 341 (2001).
79. Id. at 343.
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achieve a somewhat delicate balance of statutory objectives . . .
[which] can be skewed by allowing fraud-on-the-FDA claims under
state tort law.”80 Notably, the applicability of implied preemption
does not depend on whether the device at issue was cleared through
the PMA process. In fact, the device in Buckman was a Class III de-
vice which had been cleared via the 510(k) pathway.81 Rather, the sali-
ent question is whether the plaintiff can establish a parallel state tort
claim.
B. Parallel State Tort Claims: Filling the Gaps
Apart from substantial equivalence claims, the Riegel Court was
careful to note that there are still claims involving FDA-regulated
medical devices that will survive preemption:
State requirements are pre-empted under the MDA only to the ex-
tent that they are “different from, or in addition to” the [PMA] re-
quirements imposed by federal law. § 360k(a)(1). Thus, § 360k does
not prevent a State from providing a damages remedy for claims
premised on a violation of FDA regulations; the state duties in such
a case “parallel,” rather than add to, federal requirements.82
In practice, finding “parallel” state tort law claims that will survive
both express and implied preemption requires threading a needle and
consequently is often difficult for plaintiffs.83 This may be in part be-
cause the Riegel Court itself did not specifically identify what common
law causes of action would fall into the “parallel” category and survive
express preemption, in part because the implied preemption doctrine
articulated in Buckman was left vague, and in part because the line
between express and implied preemption is itself not always clear. All
of this leaves lower courts to perform their own analyses without per-
fect consistency across circuits.84
In Riley v. Cordis Corp., the court described the overall state of the
preemption doctrine as creating only a “narrow gap” through which
80. Id. at 348.
81. Id. at 344, 346.
82. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008) (quoting Lohr, 518 U.S. at 495).
83. For a parsing of the caselaw, see Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Navigating Between Scylla and
Charybdis: Preemption of Medical Device “Parallel Claims”, 9 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 159
(2013).
84. Id. at 160 (“The task of sorting through these doctrines has largely been left to the lower
courts, which have produced a potpourri of inconsistent and often abstruse decisions.”); Deme-
tria D. Frank-Jackson, The Medical Device Federal Preemption Trilogy: Salvaging Due Process
for Injured Patients, 35 S. ILL. U. L.J. 453, 453 (2011) (noting the “continued difficulty the courts
have had interpreting and applying the preemption provision of the MDA even following [the]
three subsequent medical device rulings by the Supreme Court”).
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plaintiff’s state-law claims “must fit if [they are] to escape” preemp-
tion.85 The court articulated a three-step test:
[T]o determine whether a claim is preempted, the Court must (1)
identify the conduct that allegedly gives [the plaintiff] a right to re-
cover damages under state law; (2) determine whether that conduct
is prohibited by the FDCA (because, if it is not, the claim is ex-
pressly preempted by § 360k(a)); and (3) determine whether the
conduct would give rise to liability under state law even if the
FDCA had never been enacted (because, if it would not, the claim is
impliedly preempted under Buckman).86
Something akin to this three-step analysis seems to be at work in
most opinions concerning medical device litigation, though courts dif-
fer on the precise standards for each step. In particular, courts tend to
diverge when it comes to interpreting the implied preemption bar—
some courts have interpreted Buckman so broadly as to hold that
many parallel medical device claims are impliedly preempted,87 while
others read it more narrowly.88 Manufacturing defect claims89 and
85. 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 777 (D. Minn. 2009).
86. Id. at 780.
87. See, e.g., In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Product Liability Litigation, 592 F.
Supp. 2d 1147, 1161 (D. Minn. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Bryant v. Medtronic, Inc., 623 F.3d 1200
(8th Cir. 2010) (“[W]hen Sections 337(a) and 360k(a)—as construed in Buckman and Riegel,
respectively—are read together, nearly all types of claims concerning FDA-approved medical
devices are preempted, including Plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn claims here.”).
88. For example, the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits hold that plaintiffs who assert recog-
nized state tort claims should not be considered impliedly preempted as a result of Buckman’s
holding. Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc., 704 F.3d 1224, 1233 (9th Cir. 2013).
89. See, e.g., Bass v. Stryker Corp., 669 F.3d 501, 511–12 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[I]f a plaintiff pleads
that a manufacturer of a Class III medical device failed to comply with either the specific
processes and procedures that were approved by the FDA or the [current Good Manufacturing
Practices] themselves and that this failure caused the injury, the plaintiff will have pleaded a
parallel [manufacturing defect] claim.”); Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 549 (7th Cir.
2010) (manufacturing defect claim implicating a violation of the FDA’s Good Manufacturing
Practices was allowed to proceed); Howard v. Sulzer Orthopedics, Inc., 382 Fed. App’x 436,
437–38 (6th Cir. 2010) (same); Warren v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., No. 4:10 CV 1346 DDN,
2011 WL 1226975 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 29, 2011) (same).
However, those claims that rest on violations of the FDA’s Good Manufacturing Practices are
sometimes barred, in part because the GMPs are not device-specific and the FDA regulations
give manufacturers some flexibility and independence to establish procedures to meet them.
Ilarraza v. Medtronic, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 582 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), illustrates the problem gener-
ally found with such claims. In that case, the plaintiff alleged that a defective medication pump
caused his injuries after the manufacturer violated several specific GMP regulations. The district
court held that because “these regulations are open to a particular manufacturer’s interpretation,
allowing them to serve as a basis for a claim would lead to differing safety requirements that
might emanate from various lawsuits,” the manufacturing defect claims that hinged on the GMP
violations were preempted. Id. at 588. See also In re Medtronic, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 1157 (finding
the GMPs are “simply too generic, standing alone, to serve as the basis for Plaintiffs’ manufac-
turing-defect claims”).
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failure to warn claims,90 especially, can sometimes survive as parallel
claims.
The failure of St. Jude Medical’s Riata defibrillator leads resulted in
a raft of litigation and offers a representative example of how tort
claims may at times serve in a complementary regulatory capacity for
medical devices. Riata was a Class III device, which had gone through
the PMA process (including fourteen PMA supplements between
1996 and 2002 to arrive at the device at issue).91 It was recalled after
St. Jude found that internal cables were poking through its outer cas-
ing, causing unwanted shocks or the failure of the device to work
when needed.92 Some of these cases had their claims dismissed as pre-
empted,93 but others survived motions to dismiss (and often ended in
settlements94).
90. See, e.g., Hughes v. Boston Scientific, 631 F.3d 762, 769–71 (5th Cir. 2011) (“To the extent
that Hughes asserts a failure to warn claim based only on Boston Scientific’s failure to comply
with FDA regulations . . . such a claim is not expressly preempted . . . . This claim does not
impose additional or different requirements to the federal regulations, but is parallel to the fed-
eral requirements.”).
91. Rosen v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 41 F. Supp. 3d 170, 174 (N.D.N.Y. 2014); Marmol v. St. Jude
Med. Ctr., 132 F. Supp. 3d 1359, 1361 (M.D. Fla. 2015).
92. Katie Thomas, Unpredictable Danger Looms Close to the Heart, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2012,
at A1. It is worth noting that the Riata saga also offers a case study showcasing some of the
failures of post-market monitoring: Although St. Jude reported in November 2011 that there was
a problem with the leads, it announced publicly that it only affected 1% of patients. An internal
report by an FDA employee argued that the company was underestimating the problem, but that
report was not made public. It was only in July 2012 that a new study was performed which made
clear that the Riata device was actually showing signs of failure for nearly 20% of patients. That
August, the FDA recommended that all patients with the Riata still implanted undergo imaging
to see if their lead was failing—but heart device specialist doctors interviewed for a September
New York Times article had not all heard of the new recommendations. Id. The delay in calling
for the recall may have been due to the weak adverse event reporting system in place. The FDA
found that as of 2009, St. Jude Medical had “failed to submit [Medical Device Reporting] reports
containing all information reasonably known to them in accordance” with the regulations gov-
erning adverse event reporting. Rosen, 41 F. Supp. 3d at 174.
93. See, e.g., Marmol, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 1370 (holding plaintiff’s failure-to-warn and manufac-
turing defect claims preempted because they were premised upon violations of FDA regulations
without parallel violations of a Florida-law duty).
94. See, e.g., Marie Thibault, St. Jude Medical Settles, Closing Out Riata Suits, MED. DEVICE &
DIAGNOSTIC INDUSTRY (Feb. 27, 2015), https://www.mddionline.com/st-jude-medical-settles-
closing-out-riata-suits (discussing St. Jude’s 2015 settlement of approximately 950 cases for an
estimated $14.25 million).
Prior to the settlement, in Rosen, the plaintiff successfully alleged that defendants failed to
comply with FDA reporting requirements concerning known adverse events, which was a viola-
tion of a federal duty that paralleled New York’s duty to exercise reasonable care in warning of
potential dangers (so the claim was not expressly preempted). 41 F. Supp. 3d at 185. The court
adhered to the narrower reading of Buckman, agreeing with the plaintiff that it only stood “for
the proposition that a plaintiff cannot bring suit based solely on a violation of the FDCA,” and
that “a defendant may still be liable under state law” for failure to warn (so the claim was not
impliedly preempted). Id. at 186. The court also held that the plaintiff “sufficiently pled a paral-
lel state claim” for manufacturing defects (in negligence and strict liability). Id. at 181.
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IV. CONCLUDING OBSERVATION: THE SALIENCE OF REFORM
AT THE AGENCY LEVEL
Given the general strength of the preemption bar, it is clear that
tort can only play a limited, complementary role in improving the
safety of medical devices on the market. Apart from 510(k) substan-
tial equivalence claims, plaintiffs must be able to allege parallel state
tort claims that will survive both express and implied preemption in
order to proceed to the merits of any given case—a tightrope that can
be difficult to walk.
As such, reform at the agency level will be the more powerful strat-
egy in improving device safety. To this end, it is critical that the FDA
moves forward on multiple fronts: Assuring, at the threshold that its
high-risk classifications are in fact well-founded;95 demonstrating a
commitment to clinical methodology (in PMA cases) that goes beyond
the formalistic recitations of competence in the Riegel preemption de-
cision; and adhering to clear guidelines (and standards) in monitoring
post-marketing device performance. Public health concerns warrant
no less.
More recently, a plaintiff sued St. Jude with a single failure to warn claim under Pennsylvania
law, after her Riata lead malfunctioned by firing six times while she was in a plane on the
tarmac. Bull v. St. Jude Med., Inc., No. 17-1141, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115730, at *14 (E.D. Pa.
July 12, 2018). This court also held that her claim was neither expressly nor impliedly preempted,
opting for the narrow reading of Buckman: For the “simple fact” that “Plaintiff’s cause of action
is a traditional state failure to warn theory premised on alleged non-compliance with federal
regulations,” it was not impliedly preempted. Id. at *28.
95. Dr. Redberg points out that: “[M]any high-risk devices, were classified as Class II, an
intermediate risk category, meant to be used for some high-risk devices on a temporary basis in
1976. Forty years later, high risk devices remain in the intermediate risk pathway, while some
have been reclassified as lower risk Class II devices.” Redberg, Improving the Safety of High-
Risk Medical Devices, supra note 22, at ___.
